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Fundamental, yet imprecise?
Michael E. Miller†
Many physical theories characterize their observables with unlimited preci-
sion. Non-fundamental theories do so needlessly: they are more precise than
they need to be to capture the matters of fact about their observables. A
natural expectation is that a truly fundamental theory would require unlim-
ited precision in order to exhaustively capture all of the fundamental physical
matters of fact. I argue against this expectation and I show that there could
be a fundamental theory with limited precision.
1. Superfluous precision. Suppose you have been tasked with measuring
the value of my height at some particular instant in time. You might proceed
by asking me to stand up straight against a wall at that instant, making
a mark just above the top of my head with a very fine tipped pen, and
measuring the distance between the mark and the floor with a meter stick.
Were you to do this you would likely find that the mark on the wall falls
between two millimeter markings on your meterstick, say the seventh and
eighth millimeter markings between the 95th and 96th centimeter markings.1
Having already measured one full length of the meter stick, you would come
to the conclusion that you have measured me to be 1.957m ± 0.001m tall.
The precision of this measurement can obviously be improved. If only one
additional decimal place of precision is required you could simply obtain a
rule with finer markings. With the aid of an electron microscope you could
determine the value with nine or ten decimal places of precision.2 In fact, on
first inspection it seems that the only limit to the precision with which my
height can be accurately determined is the resolution provided by currently
available technology. In order for the only limit on the precision to come from
such pragmatic factors, there must be a physical fact of the matter not just
about the tenth decimal place of my height but also about the nth decimal
place for any arbitrary n. If there is some level precision beyond which there
is no longer such a physical matter of fact, that marks a principled, not merely
pragmatic, limit on the precision with which my height can be measured.
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1The argument presented here generalizes straighforwardly to the case where the mark
overlaps with one of the millimeter markings.
2This would of course require indicating the position of the top of my head more precisely
than is possible with a fine tipped pen.
It turns out that there is such a principled limit. To see this note that by
a measurement of my height we mean a measurement of the distance between
the floor and the highest point on my head. Consider the determination of
the position of the highest point on my head.3 Suppose we can all agree which
cells are part of me and which electrons are parts of those cells and which
are not.4 Determining which of those electrons happens to be the furthest
from the floor at a given instant requires exactly determining each of their
positions at that instant. But this is precisely the sort of thing that quantum
mechanics indicates that there will not be a physical matter of fact about.5
At a certain level of resolution there is simply no longer a physical matter of
fact for the measurement to track. A real number provides more precision
than is required to say everything that there is to say about my height.
This conclusion tells against the expectation that there are only pragmatic
limitations to the precision with which quantities such as height can be mea-
sured. The failure of this expectation invites the following question: where
does the expectation that one should in principle be able to make meaningful
statements about my height with unlimited precision come from? I suspect
that it is the practice of physics that has led us to this expectation. Consider,
for example, the elementary physics problem of determining the vertical dis-
placement as a function of time y(t), of a block of mass, m, suspended from
a spring with spring constant, k. The dynamics of classical mechanics holds





which is solved by,





3Issues similar to those that follow obviously also affect the determination of the position
of the floor, but this is of no consequence for my argument.
4The issue that I am introducing here is completely distinct from the problem of the many
introduced in (Unger 1980).
5On most interpretations of quantum mechanics this is obvious from any one of a number
of different observations, such as that position measurements do not yield exact position
eigenstates. One might think that Bohmian mechanics presents a counterexample as it
assigns definite positions to each of the the electrons in the complicated superposition that
constitutes the top of my head. However, the measurement of any one of the electrons
instantaneously influences the positions of all of the others. As a result, any attempt to
determine whether or not a given electron is the highest will affect the positions of all of
the others, and thus there is not a unique, identifiable highest point, independent of how
one goes about the measurement process.
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Note that once m and k are fixed, and A and φ are determined by the initial
conditions of the system at t0, this solution assigns a real number to the
value of the displacement for all times t. Thus, assuming that m, k, A, and
φ are fixed with real number precision, the solution makes statements with
maximal precision in the following sense:
(MPR) A statement about a quantity Q is maximally precise iff it
ascribes a real number d ∈ R to that quantity.
In this way, our theoretical representation of the displacement leads us to
expect that there will be a physical fact about y(t) with MPR precision. But
considerations of the sort we just made in the case of my height show that
there is no physical matter of fact about the position of the edge of the block
with unlimited precision. Just as we found in the height case, the theory is
more precise than it needs to be to exhaust the physical matters of fact about
the displacement of the block.
This phenomenon is very general and consultation with an elementary
physics text will allow for examples to be elaborated ad nauseum. A moment’s
reflection will show that the same is true of a thermodynamic account of the
temperature of the room in which you are reading this paper, or a classical
electrodynamic account of the electric field at a point between two charged
plates, or the time it takes a mass to fall from the top of a building. In each
case, it is possible to convince one’s self that the MPR statements provided
by the theory are more precise than they need to be to get the facts about
the world right. Moreover, in each case the argument for the claim proceeds
by appeal to a more a fundamental theory.6
This collection of observations leads naturally to the thought that if we
had a truly fundamental theory, it would make maximally precise statements
in the sense of MPR about the fundamental physical quantities. Moreover,
the maximal precision of those statements would be necessary in order to say
everything that there is to say about the fundamental quantities. After all,
if there is a more precise truthful statement to make about the quantities,
then the theory fails to be complete, and hence fails to be fundamental.
Call quantities about which MPR statements are required to say everything
that there is to say MPR-quantities. For MPR-quantities, there are physical
matters of fact about the 50th decimal place and the 10500th decimal place,
and more generally, dN for arbitrarily large values of N :
d0.d1d2d3 . . . d1050 . . . d10500 . . . dN . . . .
6In the temperature case, consider statistical mechanics. In the electric field case, consider
quantum field theory. For the time case, the relevant considerations are similar to those
given for the height case.
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The full precision of MPR statements are required to get the facts about such
quantities right.
The remainder of this paper provides an argument for the claim that it is
mistaken to assume that a fundamental theory must necessarily make MPR
statements, as we do not have good grounds to assume that the fundamen-
tal quantities of our world are MPR-quantities. In section two I show that
quantum field theory, our best effort at a fundamental theory, fails to provide
statements about the purported fundamental physical quantities which sat-
isfy MPR. I then show that there are alternative criteria of maximal precision,
and we default to assuming a fundamental theory will make MPR statements
because it is simply difficult to imagine worlds at which this fails to be the
relevant standard of precision. In section three I provide an account of worlds
in which MPR statements are more precise than they need to be to capture
all of the fundamental physical facts, that is, an account of world with funda-
mental quantities that are not MPR-quantities. The fourth section contains
concluding remarks.
2. Standards of precision. In the last section I argued that if we want to
find a domain where the full precision of MPR statements aren’t superfluous,
then we should look to the domain described by a fundamental theory. The
Standard Model of particle physics is our current best effort at a theory of the
fundamental constituents of matter and the interactions between them.7 This
is a natural place to look for a regime whose complete description requires
MPR statements.
The first interesting thing to note is that the Standard Model does not
make MPR statements about its observables, and the reasons for its failure to
do so are diverse. There are a number of sources of finiteness to the precision
of the statements of quantum field theory which stem from the structure of
the theory itself. Issues with the short distance structure of the theory make
it best understood as an effective field theory which results in a limit to the
precision of the predictions of the theory.8 The infrared divergences of the
theory are best treated by including the energy resolution of the detector into
the theoretical expression for the observables, which produces a limit on the
precision of the prediction.9 Finally, the use of perturbation theory to extract
predictions from the theory also results in limits on their precision.10
In practice, these theoretical limits on the precision of the predictions of
7I will proceed with this intuitive understanding of fundamentality. Whether or not the
arguments below depend on one’s particular account of fundamentality is not a question
I will pursue in this paper, though it merits further investigation.
8For discussion see (Fraser 2018; Williams 2019).
9A helpful discussion of this issue is given in (Duncan 2012).
10See (Fraser, forthcoming) and (Blinded for Review) for further discussion.
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the theory are often dominated by more pragmatic limitations. The pragmatic
limitations include errors from numerical integration and lattice simulations.
They also include the need to input measured values for physical constants
in the expressions for theoretical predictions. Measured values come with
measurement uncertainties which translate to limits on the precision of the
theoretical predictions. Recall, for example, the spring example from Section
1. The mass, m, and the spring constant, k, can only be measured with some
finite level of precision. When the measurement error is included in Equation
(2), the solution no longer provides MPR statements about y(t). In practice
the error from measured values typically dominate the limit on the precision
of the theoretical value of Standard Model observables as well.
A second interesting thing to note is that even if the Standard Model
did make MPR statements, the full precision of those statements would not
be required to get the measured values completely correct.11 This is the
case because in practice, measurements will always have limited precision.
The measured values of some representative fundamental quantities and their
associated uncertainties are given in Table 1. As a result, it follows that there
is nothing about the way we use our theories, including our best effort at a
fundamental theory, to match onto the world that requires maximal precision
in the sense of MPR. Our best precision tests of the Standard Model involve
agreement between theory and experiment to on the order of 10 decimal
places. This, to put it mildly, falls rather short of the precision of MPR
statements.12 We can account for the best precision tests of our best efforts
at a fundamental theory with statements having the precision of rational
numbers.
A standard of precision more coarse than MPR might properly be thought
of as maximal for comparisons between theory and experiment. We can define
a class of more coarse standards as follows:
(MPnQ) A statement about a quantity Q is maximally precise iff
it ascribes a rational number d ∈ Q, which requires n digits to
specify as a decimal13, to that quantity.
This is an infinite class of standards, one for each value of n. For large n, MPnQ
closely approximates MPR, but for small n MP
n
Q is significantly more coarse
11A similar observation is made in (Teller 2018).
12Purcell once quipped that “There’s not enough carbon in the universe to print out the
value of one classical variable” where by classical variable he means a variable with
MPR precision. Though I will not give a detailed defense here, considerations of this
sort suggest that statements with MPR precision could not ever possibly be required to
exhaust the precision of the best measured values.
13If d is a repeating decimal, n will be the number of digits that repeat. If d terminates
with repeating zeros, n will be the number of digits occuring before the repeating zeros.
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Quantity Value Unit
Gravitational constant (G) 6.674 08(31)× 10−11 m3kg−1s−2
Planck Constant (h) 6.626 070 040(81)× 10−34 Js
Elementary Charge (e) 1.602 176 6208(98)× 10−19 C
Fine-structure Constant (α) 7.297 352 5664(17)× 10−3 –
Weak Mixing Angle (sin2 θW ) 0.2223(21) –
Electron Mass (me) 9.109 383 56(11)× 10−31 kg
Magnetic-Moment Anomaly (ae) 1.159 652 180 91(26)× 10−3 –
Proton Mass (mp) 1.672 621 898(21)× 10−27 kg
Table 1: CODATA recommended values of some fundamental constants after
(Mohr, Newell, and Taylor 2016).
than MPR. Once it is realized that there is a weaker standard of precision
that one might count as maximal for some purposes, one might wonder if
there is a standard of precision stronger than MPR. Such a standard can be
formulated as follows:
(MP∗R) A statement about a quantity Q is maximally precise iff
it ascribes a hyperreal14 number d ∈ ∗R to that quantity.
Up to this point, I have referred to MPR statements as having unlimited
precision. It should now be apparent that their precision is in fact very
limited if the relevant standard of precision is MP∗R. If one wants to demand
that a theory is maximally precise, or that a theory will need to be maximally
precise if it is to exhaustively characterize a particular physical domain, then
one needs to specify the relevant standard of maximal precision. Similarly,
the claim that a given statement is imprecise is relative to a given standard
of precision. MPnQ statements are imprecise with respect to MPR, and MPR
statements are imprecise with respect to MP∗R. Adjudicating whether or
not there could be a fundamental theory that is imprecise requires specifying
which standard it is imprecise with respect to.
One might argue that there is something natural about the choice of real
number values for physical quantities. After all, our best theories typically
employ the resources of calculus and so MPR seems like a natural standard
of precision. But the assumption that a theory will need to make MPR state-
14The hyperreal numbers contain the real numbers as a subset and the order relation on
the real numbers is a subset of the order relation on the real numbers, establishing a clear
sense in which MP∗R is strictly sharper than MPR. A clear introduction to the hyperreal
numbers can be found in (Keisler 2012).
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ments in order to exhaustively characterize the fundamental physical level
makes the mistake of imputing structural features of our theoretical repre-
sentation to the world itself. There are of course circumstances in which
we come to have grounds for thinking that our theoretical representation
tracks the structure of the world itself. In this section I have argued that
the standard of precision that comes along with our best theories does not
fall into this category. We do not have good grounds to expect that the pre-
cision of our mathematical representation of fundamental quantities tracks
the fineness-of-grain of those quantities themselves. MP100Q are sharper than
what is required to account for the best measurements of Standard Model
observables, but MP100Q is exceedingly coarse compared to MPR.
3. Fundamental, yet imprecise. In the last section I argued that we do
not use maximally precise statements, understood as MPR statements, when
we confront the domain of fundamental particle physics. I expect that many
will remain unpersuaded to drop MPR as the standard of precision we expect
to be required of a truly fundamental theory. While the argument of the last
section provided epistemic grounds for abandoning this standard, it is hard
to imagine worlds where metaphysically there fail to be facts of the matter
about the fundamental quantities with MPR precision. In this section I will
provide an account of such worlds. That is, I will make the case that there
are possible worlds where the fundamental quantities are not MPR quantities.
Consider a fundamental quantity with decimal expansion,
d0.d1d2d3 . . . d1050 . . . d10500 . . . dN . . .
An MPR statement is required to say everything there is to say about this
quantity if there is a physical matter of fact about the Nth decimal place dN
for N arbitrarily large. One way to deny this is to suppose that there exists
a dW in the expansion,
d0.d1d2d3 . . . dW . . . dN . . . ,
such that, i) there is a physical matter of fact about di for 0 ≤ i ≤ W , but ii)
there is no physical matter of fact about di for any i > W . MPR statements
are more precise than they need to be to say everything there is to say about
quantities that satisfy i) and ii), and so quantities satisfying i) and ii) are not
MPR quantities.
15
To understand this type of non-MRR quantity, we need to find a way to
15It is worth emphasizing that this is just one way to arrive at a notion of non-MPR
quantities. There may well be others worth exploring.
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make sense of the indeterminacy of the digits after dW . The account of meta-
physical indeterminacy due to Wilson, which holds that worldly indetermi-
nacy occurs when an entity has a determinable property but no determinate of
that determinable, is well-suited to this task.16 Wilson’s determinable-based
account of metaphysical indeterminacy holds that:
What it is for a [state of affairs] to be [metaphysically indetermi-
nate] in a given respect R at a time t is for the [state of affairs] to
constituitively involve an object (more generally, entity) O such
that (i) O has a determinable property P at t, and (ii) for some
level L of determination of P , O does not have a unique level-L
determinate of P at t. (Wilson 2013, p. 366)
This view can be used to understand the nature of the non-MPR quantities
as follows. Say that a fundamental physical quantity has a unique level-
L determinate of the quantity if there is a physical matter of fact about
the value of dL, the Lth decimal in the expansion for the quantity. In the
expression,
d0.d1d2d3 . . . dW . . . dN . . . ,
there are unique level-L determinates of dL for all L ≤ W , and there are not
unique level-L determinates for all L > W .
Now consider a world at which a dW exists for each of the fundamental
physical quantities. At such a world, MPR statements are more precise than
they need to be to say everything there is to say about the fundamental
physical quantities. Thus, if there are such dW , a complete fundamental
theory with be imprecise with respect to MPR. In this sense, there could be a
complete fundamental theory that is imprecise. This shows that the concept
of fundamentality is not inextricably linked with what many regard as the
natural standard of precision.
This conclusion leads naturally to the question of whether or not there
are in fact such dW for the quantities we regard as fundamental. Consider,
for example, the mass of the electron, a quantity figuring in the Standard
Model. Perhaps surprisingly, all of the available direct empirical evidence
is compatible with the mass of the electron having a finite dW . To see this
note that there are empirical consequences to the existence of such a finite
dW . Suppose that there is a finite dW for the electron mass and suppose we
16There is another account of metaphysical indeterminacy which is based on the resources
of semantic supervaluationism which might also be employed for my purposes (Barnes
2010). Whether or not this can be done successfully is not a question that I will pursue
here.
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repeatedly measure the mass of a single electron.17 If we accurately measure
with precision less than dW we will always obtain the same result since there
is a physical matter of fact about each of the digits. Now suppose that we ac-
curately measure with precision of N decimal places for N > W . In this case,
each measurement will agree on all of the decimal places up to and including
dW . But there are no physical matters of fact about dN for N > W and thus
each measurement can yield something different for these decimal places.
We should expect the digits after dW to be randomly distributed, perhaps
with some bias due to the particularities of the experimental arrangement we
choose to employ.
For a fixed W and a given quantity, the hypothesis that dW exists is
thus falsifiable. To falsify the hypothesis one simply needs to measure the
quantity repeatedly. If each measurement yields the same result for all dN
with N < W , this falsifies the hypothesis that there exists a dW for this value
of W . Currently available direct measurements of the electron mass falsify the
existence of a dW for W = 30, but those same measurements are compatible
with the existence of a dW for W = 50. The qualification about the direct
nature of the measurements is required because when the quantities figure in
dynamical theories, the dynamics may cause the indeterminacy to affect the
determinacy of other quantities in the theory. In my view, the arguments here
motivate a systematic study of the the empirical constraints on dW . A better
understanding of these constraints is essential as they determine the extent
to which we understand what it would mean for there to be fundamental
non-MPR quantities.
18
4. Conclusion. We are accustomed to thinking that some aspects of a
theory structurally correspond to aspects of the world itself. We are similarly
accustomed to thinking that some aspects of our theory are surplus and do
not represent structural aspects of reality. Our theoretical representations of
17We have independent grounds for thinking that all electrons are identical, so the experi-
ment could just as well be carried out on a collection of electrons.
18It is worth noting that a view related to the one that I have argued for in this section
has recently been advocated in (Gisin 2018). For example he claims that,
The view I am suggesting is that the first bits in the expression of [a quan-
tity] x are ‘really real’ . . . , while the very far away bits are totally random.
As time passes they get shifted to the left, one position at each time-step.
Hence, step by step they acquire some definite value. As time passes they
have a changing disposition (or propensity) to hold their eventual value.
(Gisin 2018, p. 5)
Gisin is concerned primarily with the determinacy of initial data and how it evolves over
time. How this is connected to the view I have advocated here is an interesting question,
but one which I will not pursue further in this paper.
-9-
the world come along with a natural notion of maximal precision. In most
theories it is the one captured by MPR. I have argued here that it is a mistake
to think that this particular notion of maximal precision corresponds directly
with the fineness-of-grain of the world itself and so we should not associate a
particular notion of precision with our conception of what it is for a theory
to be fundamental.
The arguments presented here have several consequences worth emphasiz-
ing. There has been recent discussion of metaphysical indeterminacy in the
case of quantum mechanics.19 The arguments presented here open the possi-
bility that this quantum mechanical indeterminacy is really a subspecies of a
more general form of metaphysical indeterminacy of physical quantities. Sec-
ond, while limitations on theoretical precision with respect to MPR have been
thought to be deficiencies of theories, the arguments presented here show that
such limits do not necessarily undermine a theory’s claim to fundamentality.
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